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ANN HARRISON and JASON SCORSE 
University of California, Berkeley 
Globalization's Impact on 
Compliance with Labor Standards 
A 
number of critics have argued that the competitive pressure imposed 
by international competition is likely to create a race to the bottom in 
global labor standards. These antiglobalization forces frequently claim that 
competition induced by globalization leads firms to ignore (or fail to com 
ply with) labor standards in efforts to cut costs. Exporters facing the chal 
lenges of international markets as well as multinationals facing cheap imita 
tors from low-wage regions may each cut costs by paying lower wages, 
hiring child labor, and imposing unsanitary working conditions on their 
workers. 
From this perspective, globalization is likely to undermine national 
efforts to impose labor standards. Even if countries are successful in passing 
legislation that introduces or raises labor standards, global pressures may 
prevent firms from adhering to them. This is likely to be the case when 
penalties for noncompliance are low. Under such circumstances, labor stan 
dard legislation (such as minimum wage laws) may be viewed simply as a 
useful but nonbinding guideline for wage-setting activities. 
On the other hand, increasing political activity by human rights organiza 
tions has focused greater scrutiny on the behavior of exporting firms and 
large multinationals. These types of firms are increasingly being held to 
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Figure 1. Average Wages, the Minimum Wage, and Compliance in Indonesia, 1990-99 
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Source: Bad? Flint Statistik. 
high standards. While there are no clear international penalties for deviation 
from local labor legislation, the effect on a firm's reputation is potentially 
significant, as enterprises like Nike have learned. 
In an effort to shed some light on the larger question of labor standards 
and globalization, we seek to examine compliance with minimum wage leg 
islation in Indonesia. Indonesia is an ideal case study because the govern 
ment made minimum wages a central component of its labor market poli 
cies in the 1990s.1 During this time, minimum wages quadrupled in nominal 
terms and doubled in real terms (see figure 1). At the same time that the 
minimum wage's real value was soaring, Indonesia's entry into international 
1. SMERU Research Institute (2001). 
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Figure 2. Share of Value of Indonesian Manufacturing Output Generated 
by Foreign Ownership or Exported, 1990-99 
Percent of total output 
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I I Manufacturing output exported 
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Source: Budan Pusat Statisdik. 
markets also increased dramatically (see figure 2). The manufacturing cen 
sus shows that the percentage of manufactured output that was exported 
doubled between 1990 and 1996, from just over 15 percent to 30 percent of 
final sales. In addition, foreign investment also increased. The percentage of 
manufacturing output accounted for by foreign firms almost doubled in the 
1990s, rising from 13 percent of output to more than 25 percent of total 
manufacturing output in 1999. 
During the 1990s, firms struggled to comply with the rising minimum 
wage. Rama shows that the increasing minimum wage led to a 10 percent 
increase in average wages, 2 percent fall in employment, and 5 percent 
average decline in investment.2 Using the manufacturing census plant-level 
data for Indonesia, we calculated average production and nonproduction 
worker wages relative to the statutory minimum from 1990 through 1999. 
As indicated by the trends in figure 1, the ratio of production-worker wages 
to the minimum wage fell from a factor of more than 3-to-2 in the early 
2. Rama (1996). 
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1990s to nearly 1-to-l in the late 1990s. This indicates that average produc 
tion-worker wages were hovering just above the minimum wage before the 
1997 financial crisis. The proportion of plants paying at least the minimum 
declined significantly during this period. While three-quarters of all plants 
paid above minimum wages to production workers in the mid-1980s, by 
1999 only about half of all plants paid average wages that exceeded the 
statutory regional minimum for production workers. 
In this paper we estimate the relationship between international competi 
tion and compliance with the statutory minimum wage in Indonesia. We 
identify firms facing international competition with two plant-level indica 
tors. First, we use the plant's export orientation as one measure of interna 
tional competition. Second, we use the plant's foreign ownership as another 
measure of international competition. Critics claim that foreign firms are 
exploiting foreign workers, although our research on developing countries 
has shown that foreign enterprises are more likely to pay higher wages.3 
This framework provides a direct test of the relationship between meas 
ures of globalization and labor standards, as defined by compliance with the 
regional minimum wage. As such, this proposed research follows pioneer 
ing work by Edmonds and Pavcnik, which explores how rice prices affected 
the use of child labor in Vietnam.4 Edmonds and Pavcnik find that an 
increase in rice prices, which followed the elimination of an embargo on 
rice exports in Vietnam, is associated with a decline in the use of child labor. 
While one advantage of Edmonds and Pavcnik is that they are able to use 
exogenous changes in rice prices to identify the impact on child labor, our 
paper has the advantage that it can establish a direct link between trade ori 
entation, ownership, and compliance with labor laws across manufacturing 
plants. To our knowledge, ours is the first attempt to identify the impact of 
global factors on compliance with labor standards using plant-level data. 
We find that there is a positive relationship between compliance with 
labor standards, outward orientation as measured by export sales, and for 
eign ownership. Exporting plants are more likely to pay at least the mini 
mum wage. However, we also find that there is a significant upward trend 
in compliance with minimum wage legislation for exporting enterprises 
during the 1990s. Since there is significant heterogeneity in worker and 
firm characteristics across industries, we then turn to an examination of the 
3. Aitken, Harrison, and Lipsey (1996); Scorse (2003). 
4. Edmonds and Pavcnik (2001). 
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garment and apparel industry. We find these same trends in garments and 
apparel. 
Our results are consistent with the increasing internal and external pres 
sures placed on Indonesia by human rights activists and other organizations 
in the 1990s. Internally, several independent labor unions were established 
in Indonesia in the early 1990s. Externally, North American and European 
Union (EU) groups expressed concern about Indonesian exporters and the 
labor market conditions of their workers, particularly in exporting sectors. 
Complaints by U.S. groups were filed first in the late 1980s and again in 
1992, citing violation of worker rights under the Generalized System of 
Preferences (GSP). The GSP allows poor countries to benefit from low tar 
iffs on their exports to the U.S. market. Although the GSP excludes textiles 
and apparel imports subject to the Multifibre Agreement (MFA), as well as 
footwear, the fact that a large share of Indonesian exports to the United 
States (20 percent) are covered by the GSP was enough to generate consid 
erable pressure.5 In addition, the Indonesian SMERU Research Institute 
notes that "the withdrawal of investment guarantees to U.S. companies that 
would ensue was a threat of potentially greater significance."6 
In response the Indonesian government made a number of policy 
changes in its minimum wage laws in the 1990s. Our analysis suggests that 
the government was successful in raising compliance with the minimum 
wage, at least in exporting sectors that were the focus of U.S. and European 
criticism. 
The Labor Standards Debate 
In the 1990s, international concern over globalization and labor stan 
dards increased dramatically. One way to gauge the extent of this new 
found interest is to count the number of articles about labor standards that 
appeared in major newspapers in the 1990s. As figure 3 demonstrates, the 
number of articles about sweatshop and child labor activities increased dra 
matically. There was a 300 percent increase in the number of articles regard 
ing child labor, and the number of articles focusing on sweatshop activities 
increased by more than 400 percent. 
5. See Elliott (1998a) for a discussion of the U.S. GSP and its impact on labor standards. 
6. SMERU Research Institute (2001). 
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Figure 3. Articles about Sweatshops and Child Labor in Major Newspapers, 1990-99* 
Number of articles 
Source: LexisNexis. 
a. Lexis maximum is 1,000 articles. 
For many globalization opponents, international labor standards have a 
strong intuitive appeal as a remedy for various forms of exploitation and 
poor working conditions common throughout the world, particularly in, but 
not to limited to, developing countries. If nations would only agree on some 
minimum set of standards, then with one grand sweep working conditions 
would be raised for all, or so the story goes. However, as with many well 
intentioned policies, the reality is not quite so simple, and motives of many 
people who support labor standards may not be so benign. In order to assess 
more accurately their potential effectiveness, a number of questions arise. 
Who sets the standards? How are they enforced and who pays for this 
enforcement? What is the punishment for noncompliance? What are the 
employment effects associated with increases in wages or costs for firms? 
What would likely be the distributional effects both across and within 
countries? 
Given these complexities, it is no surprise that depending on how and to 
what extent labor standards are implemented, they may or may not be bene 
ficial for the world's poorest (and most vulnerable) workers, whose interests 
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the standards are meant to address. The effects will largely depend on the 
general level of development of the country, for example, the level of edu 
cation, technology, and infrastructure. In addition, the economy's share of 
exports may play an important role if other countries decide to erect import 
barriers based on noncompliance. 
Although there are more than 180 international conventions (treaties) 
that address labor-related issues, the International Labor Organization (ILO) 
has established a core set of labor standards, which it articulated in its "Dec 
laration of Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work." Typically, labor 
standards can be divided into two groups: core standards, which relate to 
fundamental human rights and can be universal in their application, and 
economic standards, which are more closely tied to a country's level of eco 
nomic development and include elements such as minimum wage laws, lev 
els of benefits, and working conditions. Core labor standards are further 
divided into four groups: 
?freedom of association and the right to collectively bargain, 
?elimination of forced and compulsory labor, 
?elimination of employment discrimination, and 
?abolition of child labor. 
Two conventions pertain to each of these headings, for a total of eight 
core conventions. Ratification of these standards is left to individual mem 
ber states. Only ninety-five nations (including most European nations) have 
signed all eight, though most countries have signed at least one convention. 
Interestingly, the United States has signed only two of the eight. Upon sign 
ing a convention, a nation is subject to: international supervision, technical 
and financial support (mostly for poorer countries), and potential punish 
ment for noncompliance (although the ILO's enforcement powers are weak 
to nonexistent). 
Chau and Kanbur postulate that if ratification of these conventions were 
costless, or if the benefits greatly outweighed the costs, one would expect 
complete compliance across countries.7 Given that this is not the case, Chau 
and Kanbur investigate the determinants of signing. They find little evi 
dence that variables predicted by standard economic theory?such as per 
capita gross domestic product (GDP), degree of openness to trade, or aver 
age education?are determining factors, but rather that countries with 
higher domestic standards have a higher probability of adoption. This indi 
7. Chau and Kanbur (2001). 
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cates that adoption may be a good proxy for labor standards and a country's 
legal system plays an important role, perhaps because domestic enforce 
ment costs are highly correlated with different legal structures. Given the 
poor predictive power of standard economic variables, they conclude that 
the current understanding as to why countries choose to sign these conven 
tions is severely limited and more research is needed. 
An issue of paramount concern in any analysis of labor standards is who 
will shoulder the costs of increased labor standards. If an industry is per 
fectly competitive, additional costs will be passed directly to consumers and 
some firms will likely be forced out of business, whereas in imperfectly 
competitive industries added labor costs will be borne by producers as well, 
the proportion depending on the relative slopes of the demand and supply 
curves. Some of the more celebrated and recent successes with respect to 
labor standards in developing countries involve pledges by many of the 
world's largest shoe and garment manufacturers, such as Nike and Gap, to 
pay substantially higher wages in their South Asian factories. Even though 
the margins in these industries are reportedly very small, these companies 
obviously had some room to maneuver while still maintaining profitability. 
It is interesting to note that Nike is now planning on moving many of its 
Indonesian factories to Vietnam, where the average wage is much lower, 
although the company claims it is moving for reasons of political stability. 
Issues surrounding child labor probably best highlight the tensions inher 
ent in most discussions involving a move to stricter international standards. 
Since most child labor takes place in the poorest countries of the world, 
notably in Southeast Asia, one might reasonably suspect that these countries 
would be the most supportive of any initiatives to ban or limit the practice. 
However, the opposite is true. Fearing that such bans are simply disguised 
forms of trade protectionism, many high-ranking officials in India, China, 
and other developing countries, as well as union activists, have spoken out 
strongly against these efforts, which they think will unfairly reduce their 
country's exports. While agreeing that child labor needs to be taken seri 
ously, these officials point out that without the option of sweatshop work 
many children would be in far worse situations, often involving prostitution 
or violent criminal behavior. This position is reminiscent of the quote by 
economist Joan Robinson who said "in some situations what is worse for a 
worker than being exploited is not being exploited." 
These arguments need to be taken seriously. Discussions regarding 
wealthy countries' labor standards are often accompanied by claims that 
Ann Harrison and Jason Scorse 53 
home country industries are being forced to compete unfairly with develop 
ing country manufacturers who can draw on limitless pools of cheap labor. 
In addition, it is hard for many people in developed countries to imagine 
states in which sweatshop labor represents the best hope to get ahead in life. 
Yet this is certainly the case in large parts of the world. Neither of these 
points suggest, however, that simply because sweatshops may represent the 
best of a host of excruciatingly unpleasant alternatives, corporations should 
be allowed to ignore some minimal set of labor standards. 
Economic theory may inform one that the equilibria one witnesses in 
international labor markets?which are based (almost exclusively) on vol 
untary exchange?are Pareto optimal. This does not mean that societies 
have to accept them from a normative standpoint. This brings one back to 
the initial questions concerning the practical implementation of any policies 
that attempt to impose stricter labor standards, as well as how one goes 
about measuring their effectiveness. 
Those who argue for import restrictions on countries that employ child 
labor believe that this would provide an incentive for violating countries to 
limit the practice. However, others argue that if import barriers lead to lower 
incomes this will only exacerbate the problem, and in fact the rising 
incomes associated with freer trade will directly lead to decreases in child 
labor. Edmonds and Pavcnik address this question empirically using panel 
data from Vietnam to investigate whether increases in the domestic price of 
rice, associated with increased rice exports, has led to higher or lower inci 
dences of child labor.8 They find that in rural areas, where most people are 
both rice producers and consumers, the income effect of higher rice prices 
has greatly outweighed the higher opportunity costs of not employing chil 
dren in the work force, and therefore child labor has declined significantly. 
However, in urban areas, where families are only rice consumers, the effects 
of the rice exports on price has led to increases in child labor since urban 
incomes have declined. Since Vietnam is predominantly rural, the overall 
effect has been a decline in child labor. But given the trend toward massive 
urbanization in most developing countries, this study illustrates the potential 
for increased exports (particularly in agricultural commodities) to lead to 
higher net rates of child labor, absent any forms of government intervention. 
Maskus finds no empirical evidence to suggest that a lack of interna 
tional standards has led to significant erosion of low-skilled wages in devel 
8. Edmonds and Pavcnik (2001). 
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oped countries, or is a significant determinant of trade performance and for 
eign direct investment throughout the developing world.9 Maskus also 
reports evidence regarding the impact of labor standards on wages in export 
processing zones. He claims that overall the zones pay higher wages and 
have better working conditions, but that in some countries the minimum 
wage is less likely to be enforced in export processing zones than in the rest 
of the country. Anecdotal evidence also suggests that efforts to organize 
workers in export processing zones have been routinely suppressed. Maskus 
points out that the altruistic reasons echoed in much of the developed world 
for promoting labor standards, even if sincere, are often used as a guise for 
trade protectionism and that natural variability in labor standards is an 
inevitable result of differing levels of economic, social, and cultural devel 
opment. 
Maskus analyzes the extent to which trade instruments such as tariffs, 
import quotas, and sanctions could potentially be used to enforce interna 
tional compliance with a minimum set of core labor standards, specifically 
with respect to developing countries. He finds that trade instruments are 
never first best and that often they exacerbate the problems they are meant 
to solve (primarily because they often reduce the poorest workers' 
incomes). In addition, they can lead to other labor market distortions that 
decrease overall world welfare. He suggests a number of more targeted 
approaches to address contentious labor issues such as child labor, including 
labeling schemes as well as aid programs focused on education and poverty 
alleviation. 
Finally, Elliott has implied in a series of persuasive articles that the con 
frontational approach of proglobalizers and antiglobalizing activists in the 
1990s should be discarded.10 She also argues that many efforts to protect 
worker rights are not thinly veiled protectionist actions, but in fact are sin 
cerely motivated. As proof, she analyzes the pattern of countries sanctioned 
under the U.S. GSP for not protecting worker rights.11 It is likely that glob 
alization's current pace cannot be sustained unless it is made clear that glob 
alization benefits all the workers, not just a chosen few. Approaches need to 
be developed that allow globalization to proceed, but at the same time pro 
tect the rights of workers. 
9. Maskus (1996). 
10. Elliott (1998b and 2000). 
11. Elliott (1998a). 
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Estimation Framework 
One of the earliest papers that explicitly modeled a firm's decision 
whether to comply with a minimum wage is Ashenfelter and Smith.12 It 
shows that a profit-maximizing employer will choose not to comply with a 
minimum wage if the gains from disobeying the law outweigh the potential 
costs from noncompliance. If an employer faces a probability p of being 
caught and incurs a penalty F, then it can be shown that firms will comply 
with minimum wage legislation if 
GIL 
-(M-w) + (l/2w)[M - w]2e > 0, (1) 
where G is a function of the probability of detection p and the penalty, F; L 
is the number of employees in the firm; M is the minimum wage; w is the 
average wage paid by the firm; and e is the elasticity of demand for labor 
and is less than zero. 
If one simplifies the analysis and sets the elasticity of labor demand 
equal to zero, then firms would comply with minimum wage legislation if 
the expected penalty from violating the law, given by GIL, exceeds the addi 
tional compensation, given by the difference M-w, that needs to be paid to 
each employee when the firm complies with the minimum wage. As indi 
cated by equation 1, firms are more likely to comply with minimum wage 
legislation if the probability of detection or penalty is high, if the minimum 
wage M is low, or if the firm pays high wages. Since a large number of 
employees reduces the per employee cost of compliance in terms of the 
penalty F per worker, large firms are also less likely to comply, after con 
trolling for the probability of detection and other factors. 
Equation 1 suggests that one can set up an indicator variable: 
Xit = 1 if GIL 
- (M - w) + ( 1/2w)[M - w]2e > 0, 
= 0 if GIL 
-(M-w) + ( l/2w)[M - w]2e < or equal to 0. (2) 
This will be estimated using a probit specification. Estimating equation 2 
requires information on minimum wages; the wage, w, that would have 
been paid in the absence of minimum wage regulations; employment, L; 
and measures of the probability of compliance and penalties associated with 
noncompliance. One also needs to control for differences in types of work 
12. Ashenfelter and Smith (1979). 
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ers. Minimum wages in Indonesia vary across districts (indexed by r) and 
over time (indexed by t). These are available from the government and are 
reported in appendix table A-l. Since w is the wage that would have pre 
vailed in the absence of minimum wage legislation, w is normally not 
observed. However, in the Indonesian case, around half of all firms do not 
comply with the minimum wage. Consequently, w is defined as the average 
wage in region r at time t across all firms that do not comply with the mini 
mum wage. However, w is probably a (downward-biased) measure of the 
true w, since presumably firms that face a higher gap between w and M are 
those most likely to violate the law. 
For Indonesia, there is no existing evidence on the probability of detec 
tion. It also appears that for domestic firms, the penalty, F, for noncompli 
ance is probably close to zero.13 However, for exporting or multinational 
firms, the costs of noncompliance could be quite large due to external pres 
sure. It is also likely that the probability of detection has increased over 
time, as watchdog activists and antisweatshop organizations have increased 
vigilance over multinational activities in developing countries such as 
Indonesia. Consequently, we will focus primarily on F as a function of 
export status and multinational status. The setup also suggests that compli 
ance should vary inversely with size. We will also control for size in the 
estimation. 
According to equation 1, compliance should increase with the wage w 
paid by the firm in the absence of a minimum wage, and should fall as M 
rises. We can test this directly. The framework also suggests that compli 
ance will rise as the probability of detection and penalties for noncompli 
ance increase. We will test this by examining first whether firms with global 
contacts are more likely to comply, and second whether compliance has 
increased over time as the probability of detection has increased and the 
penalties associated with noncompliance have also increased. Consequently, 
we will estimate the following: 
Xirt 
= 
ocj + OL2Mrt + a3w/t + a4DF// + ol5EXP? 
+ 
a6SIZEirt_x + a7Z/rM + Dt + cor + eiv (3) 
The dependent variable is a zero-one variable, which indicates whether firm 
i in region r at time t pays at or above the minimum wage. To address the 
13. In Indonesia in the mid-1990s, the fine for noncompliance was equivalent to $50, not 
a large amount for most enterprises. See Rama (1996). 
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possibility of endogeneity bias, we will regress current compliance on 
lagged firm characteristics. The independent variables include export status, 
EXP, and foreign ownership, FOR. EXP and FOR will both be defined 
based on averages over the entire period. We set FOR equal to one if mean 
foreign ownership over the whole sample period is equal to or greater than 
0.1 (10 percent). We set EXP equal to one if mean export share over the 
whole period is greater than 0.2 (20 percent). In an earlier version of this 
paper, we defined EXP and FOR as continuous variables varying between 
zero and 100 percent. The previous version of the paper identified the 
impact of ownership and export status based on annual changes in EXP and 
FOR, which is potentially problematic due to reverse causation. However, 
our current approach is less likely to lead to spurious results, since small 
changes in ownership or export orientation are more likely to be due to 
measurement error or changes in compliance itself. Nevertheless, both 
approaches yield very similar results. The vector Z includes a number of 
factors that could be correlated with FOR and EXP and are likely to affect 
X. This includes worker characteristics and other firm characteristics such as 
capital intensity. As indicated in figure 1, compliance is a much more seri 
ous problem for production workers. Consequently equation 3 will be esti 
mated separately for production and nonproduction workers. Some years in 
the survey include additional information on employee education and expe 
rience. When available, these will also be included. Estimation will also 
include dummy variables to take into account the possibility of region-, 
time-, and industry-specific effects, captured in equation 3 by cor and Dv 
Why should greater international competition negatively affect compli 
ance with labor standards? In an imperfectly competitive framework, it is 
easy to show that maximizing firm profits with respect to employment leads 
to a first order condition where wages are a positive function of final goods' 
prices. If domestic markets no longer are protected from foreign competi 
tion, international prices (which may be lower than domestic prices) could 
put downward pressure on wages (w in equations 1 and 2) and consequently 
lead to lower compliance with the minimum wage. If there is imperfect 
competition, footloose foreign firms may be more likely to appropriate rents 
relative to domestic enterprises. On the other hand, it is equally possible that 
exporters and multinational firms are more likely to comply with domestic 
labor standards. In the 1990s pressure from international human rights 
activists led a number of enterprises to be more careful about compliance 
with domestic labor standards. One major motivating factor was to avoid the 
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Figure 4. Articles about Indonesia and Sweatshops or Child Labor 
in Major Newspapers, 1990-99 
Source: LexisNexis. 
kind of negative publicity encountered by firms like Nike. In the framework 
above, this suggests that exporters and multinationals face both a higher/?? 
the probability of detection?and higher penalty F. The higher p results 
from the additional scrutiny placed on these firms in the 1990s, while the 
higher penalty F is indicative of the greater costs to multinationals of acquir 
ing a negative reputation with respect to compliance with labor standards. 
To the extent that antisweatshop activism in the 1990s affected multina 
tional and exporter behavior, we would expect exporters and multinationals 
to increase compliance over time. Figure 4 shows that the number of news 
paper articles that have highlighted sweatshop or child labor activities in 
Indonesia has multiplied. This suggests that both F and p have probably 
increased. 
If compliance has increased, this suggests a modified version of equa 
tion 3: 
Xirt 
= 
ax + CL2Mn + a3wrt + a4DF// + a5EXPi + a6SIZEirt_{ 
+ 
vjZirt_x + afifDFIi + a2D,*EXP, + Dt + cor + eit. (4) 
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Activism was also concentrated in key sectors such as textiles and apparel. 
Consequently, we analyze whether compliance rates for multinationals vary 
across sectors. To the extent that activism may have led to higher compli 
ance rates for some multinationals in certain sectors, we would also expect 
differential effects on production worker employment. An examination of 
how differential compliance may have affected employment follows. 
Compliance in Indonesia 
The data for this analysis comes from the annual manufacturing survey 
of Indonesia collected and compiled by the Indonesian government's statis 
tical agency, Badan Pusat Statisdik (BPS). The completion of this survey is 
mandatory under Indonesian law. Therefore the data captures the entire pop 
ulation of Indonesian manufacturing firms, which ranged from approxi 
mately 13,000 in 1990 to more than 18,000 in 1999. The survey includes 
over 400 questions in any given year, the large majority of which remain 
constant, although in certain periods additional questions are included and 
others removed. Over the ten-year period, there is an average of 4.5 obser 
vations per firm, reflecting the fact that some firms go out of business, while 
others enter. 
There are two obvious sources of measurement error in the data. The first 
is human error in either completing the questionnaire or reading the data 
from it. A fairly significant percentage of the observations include nonsensi 
cal entries such as a negative number of workers, negative age of the firm, 
or zero level of output. These observations were dropped. This could poten 
tially bias the results if they were systematic, but an inspection of the data 
revealed no underlying patterns in the erroneous values. 
Another potential source of measurement error is the inclusion of pur 
posefully untruthful information. Given that Indonesia has minimum wage 
laws, there would appear to be an incentive for firms to exaggerate wages in 
order to feign compliance. However, whether due to ignorance of these laws 
or a lack of enforcement, a very large percentage of firms reported wages 
significantly below the minimum for a number of years. These compliance 
estimates are consistent with other studies that examine compliance with the 
minimum wage in Indonesia, including those by the Indonesian SMERU 
Research Institute and Alatas and Cameron.14 These studies, based on both 
14. SMERU Research Institute (2001) and Alatas and Cameron (2003). 
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worker surveys and the Indonesian Labor Force Survey (Sakernas), indicate 
that "a sizable portion of the sample is receiving less than the minimum 
wage."15 The SMERU Research Institute analyzed compliance rates with 
the minimum wage in Indonesia using a sample of forty firms that reported 
worker-specific wages within each firm, as well as the national labor force 
survey. They found compliance rates of about 70 percent, comparable to 
those reported in figure 1. Alatas and Cameron report the kernel density 
estimates of the monthly wage distribution for West Java and Jakarta.16 
These figures, based on the individual-level surveys, also imply rates of 
noncompliance as high as 40 percent. These high levels of noncompliance 
are likely to be accurate, since individual households have no incentive to 
misreport their earnings for the labor force surveys. Using plant-level data 
for Morocco, Harrison and Currie also find self-reported noncompliance 
rates of up to 50 percent in Morocco, presumably due to a lack of enforce 
ment or fear of penalties as well.17 These other studies, many of them also 
on Indonesia, suggest the high rates of noncompliance with the minimum 
wage reported in figure 1 are likely to be accurate. 
We begin by identifying broad trends in minimum wage compliance in 
Indonesia, focusing on the period from 1990 through 1999. We focus on this 
period because information on export orientation was not collected before 
1990, and information on worker characteristics is only available during the 
mid-1990s. Using the manufacturing census plant-level data for Indonesia, 
we calculated average production and nonproduction worker wages relative 
to the statutory minimum from 1990 through 1999. Since the minimum 
wage is supposed to apply only to base wages, we computed compliance as 
the plant's average wage for production and nonproduction workers sepa 
rately, compared to the minimum wage as defined in appendix table A-l. 
The plant's average wage is defined as basic compensation (salary) divided 
by the number of workers in that skill category. As indicated by the trends in 
figure 2, the ratio of production worker wages to the minimum wage fell 
from a factor of two to one, indicating that average production worker 
wages are now hovering just above the minimum wage. 
Figure 5 shows the percentage of domestic firms that complied with the 
minimum wage during the 1990s. As indicated in figure 5, the percentage of 
15. Alatas and Cameron (2003, p. 16). 
16. Alatas and Cameron (2003). 
17. Currie and Harrison (1997). 
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Figure 5. Domestic Firm Compliance with Minimum Wage Laws, Indonesia, 1990-99 
Percent 
BB I*11"* minimum wage for production workers 
II Paid minimum wage for nonproduction workers '' i?i r?i 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Source: Budan Pusat Statisdik. 
domestic firms that paid the minimum wage to production workers ranged 
from 65 percent in 1990 to a low of less than 40 percent in 1995. In the mid 
1990s, less than half of all domestic enterprises paid an average wage to 
production workers that exceeded the statutory minimum. Since nonproduc 
tion workers were paid a higher wage, the extent of compliance with the 
minimum wage for nonproduction workers is significantly greater. Compli 
ance with the minimum wage for nonproduction ranged from a low of 75 
percent in the mid-1990s to a high of nearly 90 percent in 1990. Neverthe 
less, a large fraction of domestically owned enterprises failed to pay average 
wages above the statutory minimum. 
Figure 6 compares compliance with minimum wage laws for firms with 
and without foreign ownership. Panel a of figure 6 reports compliance rates 
for production workers, while the bottom portion reports compliance for 
nonproduction workers. A remarkable difference in compliance rates across 
both sets of enterprises is demonstrated, although the differences are much 
larger for (the lesser paid) production workers. Compliance rates for foreign 
firms during the mid-1990s were nearly double those for domestic enter 
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Figure 6. Firm Compliance with Minimum Wage Laws, Based on Domestic or Foreign 
Ownership, Indonesia, 1990-99 
Percent a. For production workers 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Percent b. For nonproduction workers 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
^B Foreign Arms I I Domestic firms 
Source: Budan Pusat Statisdik. 
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prises. While less than 40 percent of domestically owned enterprises paid 
production workers average wages that exceeded the minimum wage in 
1995, 70 percent of foreign firms did so. At the beginning of the decade, 
almost 90 percent of all foreign enterprises paid average wages that equaled 
or exceeded the statutory minimum. While compliance rates fell in the mid 
1990s, by 1999 more than 80 percent of foreign enterprises paid wages that 
exceeded or equaled the statutory minimum for production workers. The 
results for nonproduction workers (panel b) are similar, but the differences 
are less dramatic. Over all years, foreign enterprises were significantly more 
likely to comply with the statutory minimum wage, with 90 percent of all 
enterprises paying average wages to nonproduction workers that equaled or 
exceeded the minimum wage. For domestic enterprises, the rate of compli 
ance is lower: compliance ranged from 70 percent in 1995 to slightly over 
90 percent in 1990. 
Figure 7 compares the extent of minimum wage compliance across 
domestic plants that exported a percentage of their sales abroad versus those 
oriented toward the domestic market. Over the entire time period the per 
centage of domestic exporters that complied with the minimum wage laws 
for production workers was consistently fifteen to twenty points higher than 
for domestic plants that only produced for the domestic market (panel a). 
The results for nonproduction workers are also similar, but less pronounced 
(panel b). Again, exporting firms were significantly more likely to comply 
with minimum wage legislation than firms oriented toward the domestic 
market. 
These broad trends appear to suggest that multinationals and other firms 
exposed to international competition are more likely to comply with mini 
mum wage legislation. These trends also suggest that compliance with mini 
mum wage legislation has increased over time, particularly for firms faced 
with international competition. The more formal results, presented below, 
confirm the trends outlined in these figures. 
Estimation Results 
The first set of econometric results is presented in table 1. We begin with 
the results for production workers, who are considered (an imperfect proxy 
for) unskilled workers. Rather than report the coefficients derived from the 
maximum likelihood estimation, we report the implied change in the proba 
bility of compliance due to a marginal change in the independent variable. 
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Figure 7. Domestic Firm Compliance with Minimum Wage Laws, Based on Export 
Status, Indonesia, 1990-99 
Percent a. For production workers 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Percent b. For nonproduction workers 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Firms with no exports CD Firms with exports 
Source: Sudan Pusat Statisdik. 
Table 1. Probit Results for Dependent Variable Pay Minimum Wagea 
Production workers Nonproduction workers 
Variable (I) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Log Minwage 
Log Nominwage 
Foreign (FOR> 0.1) 
Exports (EXP > 0.2) 
SIZE(-l) 
Worker controls0 
Plant controls0 
Dummies (all)d 
Period 
Number of observations 
R2 
-.7377 
(.022)** 
.2770 
(.008)** 
.2040 
(.006)** 
.0575 
(.005)** 
.0001 
(.000004)** 
No 
No 
Yes 
1990-99 
110,032 
.1341 
.1549 
(.050)* 
.2512 
(.015)** 
.1925 
(.011)** 
.0556 
(.008)** 
.0001 
(.000006)** 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
1995-97 
39,612 
.1200 
.2482 
(.070)** 
.0871 
(.021)* 
-.0401 
(.009)** 
-.00005 
(.000006)** 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
1995-97 
30,878 
.1430 
-.2780 
(.018)** 
.1341 
(.005)** 
.0722 
(.005)** 
.0581 
(.003)** 
(.00006) 
(.000004)** 
No 
No 
Yes 
1990-99 
89,042 
.0871 
.0597 
(.052) 
.2348 
(.012)** 
.0771 
(.0008)** 
.0653 
(.006)** 
.00007 
(.000007)** 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
1995-97 
32,030 
.0872 
.1304 
(.052)* 
-.0036 
(.011) 
.0053 
(.007) 
-.00005 
(.000005)** 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
1995-97 
30,857 
.1238 
* Significant at the 5 percent level; ** significant at the 1 percent level. 
a. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
b. Log number of male and female employees by educational category (no school, some primary, junior high, senior high, and college). 
c. Capital inputs, materials, prices, and technology expenditures. 
d. Province dummies, ISIC dummies, and year dummies. 
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At the sample mean, the predicted probability of compliance with the mini 
mum wage is 49 percent for production workers and 80 percent for nonpro 
duction workers. As indicated by the earlier figures, compliance is much 
more of a problem for production workers. 
As expected, a higher minimum wage results in lower compliance. The 
implied probability, -0.738, suggests that a 1 percent increase in the man 
dated minimum wage at the sample mean would lower compliance by 
0.7 percent. Higher wages in the absence of minimum wage legislation, 
captured by the average wage for noncomplying firms, also lead to higher 
compliance. As expected, if the wage that would have been paid in the 
absence of minimum wages is higher, then the costs of complying with the 
legislation are lower and compliance is more likely. The point estimate sug 
gests that a 10 percent increase in the wage that would have been paid in the 
absence of the minimum would lead to an increase in the probability of 
compliance of almost 3 percent. These results are consistent with the broad 
trends outlined earlier, where we saw an increase in the statutory minimum 
wage in the earlier part of the decade accompanied by a fall in compliance. 
Following the 1997 crisis (when the rate of inflation soared), the real value 
of the minimum wage declined and the real value of the alternative wage 
rose. Both trends were accompanied by an increase in compliance. 
The coefficients on DFI and EXP indicate that exporting plants and 
plants with foreign equity participation are more likely to comply with min 
imum wage legislation. The point estimate on DFI suggests that if a foreign 
owner were to take over a domestic enterprise, compliance with minimum 
wage legislation would increase by 20 percent. The coefficient on export 
status suggests that an exporting plant is 6 percent more likely to comply 
with minimum wage legislation than a nonexporter. The only variable that is 
not consistent with expectations is SIZE. Larger plants are more likely to 
comply with minimum wage legislation. Size, however, is a proxy for many 
other factors, which are included later in the analysis. 
The fourth column of table 1 examines the determinants of compliance 
with minimum wage legislation for nonproduction workers. The results are 
similar, but the importance of factors such as minimum wages, alternative 
wages, and plant-level characteristics are less significant. This is in part 
because nonproduction workers are generally higher skilled workers and 
wage determination is less likely to be affected by minimum wage legisla 
tion. The results suggest that foreign ownership would result in a 7 percent 
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higher probability of compliance with minimum wages for these types of 
workers. For exporters, the probability is 6 percent higher. 
The second and fifth columns of table 1 add details on educational attain 
ment for employees at the individual plant. However, the sample is restricted 
to the years 1996 through 1998, the only three years during which the survey 
included questions regarding the educational attainment of the plant's labor 
force.18 Although not shown, the results suggest that as the share of more 
educated workers in the plant rises, the probability of compliance with the 
minimum wage also rises. Even for women, who are significantly less likely 
to receive the minimum wage no matter their education level, the probability 
that they will receive at least the minimum wage rises as their educational 
attainment rises. The addition of controls for educational attainment does not 
affect the magnitude or the significance of the coefficients on DFI or EXP, 
which remain positive and statistically significant. 
The third and sixth columns in table 1 restrict the analysis to 1996 
through 1998, but include additional plant-level controls. Plant-level con 
trols include the logs of real material inputs, real value of the reported capi 
tal stock, the average wages for production and nonproduction workers in 
the region, the output price for that four-digit sector, and investment in 
machinery at the plant level. If we include these additional controls, the 
coefficient on FOR in the production worker specification is cut in half, but 
remains statistically significant and positive. The coefficient on EXP for 
production workers becomes statistically significant and negative. In col 
umn 6, which reports the results for nonproduction workers, both DFI and 
EXP become small in magnitude and statistically insignificant. Why? Both 
DFI and EXP are highly correlated with capital stock. In previous regres 
sions, ownership and trade orientation were significant partly because they 
are a proxy for capital intensity. The results in columns 3 and 6 provide an 
explanation for why multinationals and exporters are more likely to pay the 
minimum wage: they are more capital-intensive, highly productive enter 
prises whose workers are more highly paid. 
The fact that the coefficient on EXP switches signs, from significantly 
positive to significantly negative, is worth discussion. Without plant con 
trols, we find that exporting enterprises are more likely to comply with min 
18. The education variables are only available for 1995-97, but because we use lags, the 
years in the estimation are 1996-98. 
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imum wage legislation. These results confirm what we find in the graphs. 
Without controlling for plant characteristics, we find that these firms are 
more likely to comply with minimum wage legislation. However, once we 
control for plant characteristics, we find less compliance among exporters. 
In other words, among plants with the same characteristics in terms of capi 
tal intensity, technology, and so on, exporters are less likely to comply. This 
result is consistent with the idea that international competition forces firms 
to cut wages. 
Table 2 reports the results of estimating equation 4, where we allow the 
coefficient on DFI and EXP to vary over time. The basic results, reported in 
columns 1 and 4 for production and nonproduction workers, are generally 
consistent with the earlier specification. However, the only coefficient that 
appears to vary as a function of time is the coefficient on export status for 
production workers. The coefficient on EXP*t indicates that the probability 
of compliance with minimum wage legislation increased by almost half a 
percent a year. This result is robust across specifications. The evidence for 
Indonesia suggests a strong increase in compliance with minimum wage 
legislation for exporting plants. 
If we restrict the sample to the three years that report worker characteris 
tics, the results are similar and even more pronounced. The implied proba 
bilities are reported in columns 2 and 4 of table 2. Again, the results suggest 
that there is no clear trend in compliance over time for foreign enterprises, 
but that exporters became more likely to pay minimum wages to their pro 
duction workers over the sample period. During those three years, during 
the peak of antisweatshop activism, the likelihood of compliance for 
exporters increased by about 4 percentage points a year. 
The third and sixth columns of table 2 include additional plant-level con 
trols. As in table 1, the addition of plant controls reduces the magnitude and 
statistical significance of the coefficients on EXP and DFL Again, it appears 
that the factors driving the higher compliance of foreign and exporting 
plants with minimum wage laws are their higher productivity and capital 
intensity. In the early part of the 1990s, there is a marked difference between 
the degree of compliance across exporters and nonexporters: the coefficient 
on EXP suggests that exporting firms were 12 percentage points more likely 
to fail to comply with the minimum wage, compared to other firms with 
similar characteristics. However, over time the rate of compliance among 
exporters increased faster than among nonexporters, resulting in a higher 
probability of compliance by the end of the decade. 
Table 2. Probit Results for Dependent Variable Pay Minimum Wage, with Interaction Terms11 
Production workers Nonproduction workers 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Log Minwage 
Log Nominwage 
Foreign (-1) 
Exports (-1) 
F0#*year (-1) 
?XP*year (-1) 
SIZE(-l) 
Worker controls 
Plant controls 
Dummies (all) 
Period 
Number of observations 
R2 
-.7376 
(.022)** 
.2770 
(.008)** 
.1965 
(.017)** 
.0318 
(.011)** 
.0013 
(.003) 
.0046 
(.002)** 
.0001 
(.000004)** 
No 
No 
Yes 
1990-99 
110,032 
.1342 
.0870 
(.062) 
.2556 
(.015)** 
.1979 
(.028)** 
-.0259 
(.017) 
-.0020 
(.013) 
.0396 
(.007)** 
.0001 
(.000006)** 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
1995-97 
39,612 
.1206 
.2153 
(.071)** 
.0902 
(.031)** 
-.1168 
(.019)** 
-.0014 
(.014) 
.0388 
(.009)** 
-.00005 
(.000006)** 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
1995-97 
30,878 
.1436 
-.2791 
(.018)** 
.1343 
(.005)** 
.0526 
(.014)** 
.0638 
(.008)** 
.0041 
(.003) 
-.0011 
(.001) 
.00006 
(.000004)** 
No 
No 
Yes 
1990-99 
89,042 
.0872 
.0593 
(.052) 
.2349 
(.012)** 
.0772 
(.022)** 
.0645 
(.014)** 
-.00007 
(.012) 
.0004 
(.007) 
.00007 
(.000007)** 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
1995-97 
32,030 
.0872 
.1283 
(.052)* 
-.0007 
(.027) 
-.0028 
(.016) 
-.0014 
(.012) 
.0040 
(.007) 
-.00005 
(.000005)** 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
1995-97 
30,857 
.1239 
** Significant at the 1 percent level. 
a. Standard errors are in parentheses. See also notes to table 1. 
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Much of the debate over labor standards has focused on certain key 
industries. In particular, much of the attention has focused on sweatshop 
activities such as textiles and apparel. In table 3 we restrict the sample to 
textiles, apparel, and footwear. An additional benefit of restricting the sam 
ple to these three sectors is that the employees in these industries are likely 
to be more homogeneous in quality, further limiting the scope for hetero 
geneity in the labor force. 
The results reported in table 3 are similar to those presented in tables 1 
and 2. The first and fifth columns of table 3 indicate that a 100 percent 
increase in foreign ownership or export orientation would increase the prob 
ability of compliance with minimum wages by 12-14 percent for produc 
tion workers and 6-8 percent for nonproduction workers. If we add worker 
characteristics, the results are generally unaffected, as reported in columns 2 
and 6 of table 3. Allowing the coefficient on EXP and DFI to vary over time 
(columns 4 and 8) also leads to results that are almost identical with the 
larger sample. The evidence suggests a significant increase in minimum 
wage compliance for exporters in the 1990s with respect to production 
workers, rising by almost 2 percent a year. 
Although similar to tables 1 and 2, there is one result in table 3 that is 
quite striking: the size of the compliance effect for exporters. Exporters in 
these sectors are significantly more likely to comply with minimum wage 
legislation. This is true even if we add plant-level controls to the specifica 
tion. In addition, exporters in this sector are increasing compliance over 
time twice as quickly as exporters in other sectors. The results in table 3 
suggest that these sectors are indeed different. Whether these differences 
stem from human rights activism and international pressure remains a topic 
for future research. 
Extensions, Robustness Tests, Employment Effects 
This section discusses a number of additional results. If the analysis 
departs from the probit framework outlined above and estimates a linear 
probability model, the results are similar to those reported here. Alternative 
specifications, which introduce plant fixed effects and allow for the endo 
geneity of foreign ownership and export status, yield similar results. Instru 
ments used for this analysis include the number of other foreign firms or 
exporters in the same location, as well as market size in the region and 
industry. Previous studies suggest that two of the major determinants of for 
Table 3. Probit Results for Dependent Variable Pay Minimum Wage, Textile, Apparel, and Footwear Sectors Only8 
Production workers Nonproduction workers 
Variable a) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Log Minwage 
Log Nominwage 
Foreign (-1) 
Exports (-1) 
F6W*year(-l) 
EXP*year(-l) 
S/Z?(-l) 
Worker controls 
Plant controls 
Dummies (all) 
Years 
Number of observations 
R2 
-.9943 
(.054)** 
.2846 
(.023)** 
.1153 
(.015)** 
.1358 
(.001)** 
.2361 
(.165) 
.2918 
(.044)** 
.1081 
(.016)** 
.1556 
(.016)** 
.00007 
(.000006)** 
No 
No 
Yes 
1990-99 
21,326 
.1012 
.00007 
(.00001)** 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
1995-97 
7,602 
.0647 
.1627 
(.25) 
.0312 
(.025) 
.042 
(.019)* 
-.00003 
(.000009)** 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
1995-97 
5,693 
.1053 
-1.002 
(.054)** 
.2826 
(.023)** 
.1036 
(.041)* 
.0518 
(.022)* 
.0014 
(.006) 
.0158 
(.004)** 
.00006 
(.000006)** 
No 
No 
Yes 
1990-99 
21,326 
.1020 
-.4070 
(.045)** 
.1016 
(.020)** 
.0600 
(.010)** 
.0755 
(.007)** 
.1756 
(.151) 
.0932 
(.040)* 
.0674 
(.019)** 
.1022 
(.013)** 
.00004 
(.000006)** 
No 
No 
Yes 
1990-99 
16,446 
.0893 
.2006 
(.185) 
.0168 
(.022) 
.0383 
(.015)* 
.00003 
(.000009)** 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
1995-97 
5,883 
.0800 
-.00003 
(.000006)** 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
1995-97 
5,721 
.1170 
.4080 
(.047)** 
.1033 
(.020)** 
.0684 
(.029)* 
.0419 
(.017)* 
-.0022 
(.006) 
.0068 
(.003)* 
.00004 
(.000006)** 
No 
No 
Yes 
1990-99 
16,446 
.0897 
* Significant at the 5 percent level; ** significant at the 1 percent level, 
a. Standard errors are in parentheses. See also notes to table 1. 
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eign investment and export status are the size of the domestic market and 
agglomeration effects due to the presence of other enterprises.19 The results 
are qualitatively similar to those reported here. Harrison and Scorse also 
explore the implications of labor standards for employment and the plant's 
exit decision.20 They also analyze whether increasing foreign competition, 
as proxied by foreign market share, has driven domestic firms to reduce 
compliance with labor standards. 
In this section, we focus on two important considerations: other possible 
explanations for the increase in minimum wage compliance for exporters in 
the 1990s, and the consequences for employment of higher minimum wage 
compliance among exporters and multinational plants. There are several 
alternative explanations for the increase in compliance among exporters. 
First, exporters may have experienced a rise in profitability relative to other 
firms, particularly in light of the currency crisis that led to a large devalua 
tion of the currency and consequently improved the competitiveness of 
exporting enterprises. Second, exporters may have self-selected into export 
ing on the basis of higher profitability or higher productivity. Previous stud 
ies suggest that the more productive enterprises are most likely to export. 
Consequently, we redo the analysis, controlling for plant-level profitability 
and plant-level productivity growth, using total factor productivity growth 
(TFPG) as our measure of productivity. We also explore the consequences 
of redefining worker compensation to include in-kind payments. Minimum 
wage regulations provide that up to 25 percent of the wage may be provided 
in the form of permanent in-kind benefits such as food, lodging, or trans 
portation. Although the majority of formal sector enterprises ignore this pro 
vision and interpret the minimum wage law as applying strictly to regular 
cash compensation, a number of the smaller enterprises may include in-kind 
payments in the wage bundle in an effort to comply with the minimum 
wage. 
The results are reported in table 4. The coefficients on both plant-level 
profitability and TFPG, though not reported in table 4, are positive and sig 
nificant. Plants with higher profitability or higher productivity growth 
exhibit higher compliance rates with minimum wage legislation. However, 
the addition of these controls does not alter the original results. The coeffi 
19. See Aitken, Hanson, and Harrison (1997) and Eskeland and Harrison (2003). 
20. Harrison and Scorse (2003). 
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cient on foreign investment continues to be positive and significant, even 
with the addition of plant and worker controls. For foreign investment, the 
interaction with time continues to be insignificant, indicating no changes in 
compliance during the 1990s. As before, the coefficient on export status 
turns negative and significant with the addition of worker and plant charac 
teristics. The coefficient on export status interacted with time is significant 
and positive, indicating an increase in compliance during the 1990s for 
exporters. These results control for increasing profitability and productivity 
of exporters, suggesting that the increase in compliance is not due to these 
kinds of previously unobserved, time-varying measures. 
The bottom half of table 4 replaces the compliance measure with a meas 
ure that includes in-kind payments to workers. As indicated above, Indone 
sian law allows firms to include a fraction of in-kind payments as part of so 
called minimum wages. If we add in-kind payments to wages, the results 
are unaffected. The only difference is that now the likelihood of compliance 
for foreign enterprises is even greater, suggesting that foreign firms pay an 
even larger fraction of worker salaries in the form of in-kind payments than 
other kinds of enterprises. 
We next turn to an examination of the employment effects of higher 
minimum wages. The orthodox approach to minimum wages suggests that 
an increase in mandated wages should lead to a fall in employment, as 
employers are driven up their labor demand curve. Before the 1990s stan 
dard textbook treatments of minimum wages reported that imposing a 
wage floor would lead to adverse consequences for employment. However, 
a series of influential studies published by David Card and Alan Krueger in 
the 1990s reopened the debate on the employment effects of minimum 
wages.21 In their book Myth and Measurement: The New Economics of the 
Minimum Wage, Card and Krueger argue that the imposition of a minimum 
wage need not have negative employment consequences if there are imper 
fections in the labor market. These imperfections include the following 
possibilities: the existence of monopsony employers, search costs for 
employers, and efficiency wages. If any of these three characterize the 
local labor market, an increase in the minimum wage (or an increase in 
compliance with the existing minimum wage) could lead to an increase in 
employment. Card and Krueger document their claim with a series of 
21. See Card and Krueger (1994 and 1995). 
Table 4. Probit with Dependent Variable Pay Minimum Wage, Select Results8 
Production workers Nonproduction workers 
Specification Foreign Exports FOR*time EXP*time Foreign Exports FOR*time EXP*time 
1. Without worker and plant controls, 
1990-99 
2. With worker controls, 1995-97 
3. With worker and plant controls, 
1995-97 
4. With time interactions, 1990-99 
5. With worker controls and time 
interactions, 1995-97 
6. With worker, plant, and time 
interactions, 1995-97 
7. With TFPG and profit margins, 
1990-99 
8. With TFPG, profit margins, and 
worker controls, 1995-97 
9. With TFPG, profit margins, and 
worker and plant controls, 1995-97 
10. As 7 with time interactions 
11. As 8 with time interactions 
.2040 
(.006)** 
.1925 
(.011)** 
.0871 
(.021)* 
.1965 
(.017)** 
.1979 
(.028)** 
.0902 
(.031)** 
.1918 
(.006)** 
.1901 
(.011)** 
.0830 
(.012)** 
.1940 
(.016)** 
.1957 
(.028)** 
.0575 
(.005)** 
.0556 
(.008)** 
-.0401 
(.009)** 
.0318 
(.011)** 
-.0259 
(.017) 
-.1168 
(.019)** 
.0515 
(.005)** 
.0537 
(.008)** 
-.0433 
(.009)** 
.0326 
(.011)** 
-.02893 
(.018) 
.0013 
(.003) 
-.0020 
(.013) 
-.0014 
(.014) 
-.0005 
(.003) 
-.0027 
(.013) 
.0046 
(.002)** 
.0396 
(.007)** 
.0388 
(.009)** 
.0035 
(.002) 
.0407 
(.006)** 
.0722 
(.005)** 
.0771 
(.0008)** 
-.0036 
(.011) 
.0526 
(.014)** 
.0772 
(.022)** 
-.0007 
(.027) 
.0689 
(.004)** 
.0748 
(.008)** 
-.0053 
(.011) 
.0517 
(.014)** 
.0708 
(.022)** 
.0581 
(.003)** 
.0653 
(.006)** 
.0053 
(.007) 
.0638 
(.008)** 
.0645 
(.014)** 
-.0028 
(.016) 
.0568 
(.003)** 
.0649 
(.006)** 
.0050 
(.007) 
.0629 
(.008)** 
.0642 
(.013)** 
.0041 
(.003) 
-.00007 
(.012) 
-.0014 
(.012) 
.0036 
(.003) 
.0018 
(.012) 
-.0011 
(.001) 
.0004 
(.007) 
.0040 
(.007) 
-.0012 
(.001) 
-.0002 
(.007) 
12. As 9 with time interactions 
13. As 1 with wages, including in-kind 
payments 
14. As 2 with wages, including in-kind 
payments 
15. As 3 with wages, including in-kind 
payments 
16. As 4 with wages, including in-kind 
payments 
17. As 5 with wages, including in-kind 
payments 
18. As 6 with wages, including in-kind 
payments 
19. As 7 with wages, including in-kind 
payments 
20. As 8 with wages, including in-kind 
payments 
21. As 9 with wages, including in-kind 
payments 
22. As 10 with wages, including in-kind 
payments 
23. As 11 with wages, including in-kind 
payments 
24. As 12 with wages, including in-kind 
payments 
.0823 
(.031)** 
.1841 
(.006)** 
.1828 
(.011)** 
.0934 
(.012)** 
.1760 
(.016)** 
.1978 
(.027)** 
.1078 
(.030)** 
.1741 
(.006)** 
.1781 
(.011)** 
.0890 
(.012)** 
.1708 
(.016)** 
.1907 
(.027)** 
.1032 
(.030)** 
-.1176 
(.019)** 
.0456 
(.005)** 
.0411 
(.008)** 
-.0434 
(.009)** 
.0233 
(.010)* 
-.0354 
(.017)* 
-.1138 
(.019)** 
.0394 
(.005)** 
.0390 
(.008)** 
-.0456 
(.009)** 
.0133 
(.011) 
-.0406 
(.018)* 
-.1114 
(.019)** 
-.0020 
(.014) 
.0352 
(.009)** 
.0015 
(.003) 
-.0075 
(.013) 
-.0073 
(.014) 
.0006 
(.003) 
-.0065 
(.014) 
-.0073 
(.014) 
.0040 
(.002)* 
.0374 
(.008)** 
.0351 
(.009)** 
.0048 
(.002)* 
.0397 
(.008)** 
.0322 
(.009)** 
-.0118 
(.028) 
.1035 
(.008)** 
.1075 
(.011)** 
-.0077 
(.011) 
.0949 
(.021)** 
.1282 
(.027)** 
-.0067 
(.027) 
.0604 
(.006)** 
.0715 
(.008)** 
-.0092 
(.011) 
.0292 
(.017) 
.0672 
(.022)** 
-.0100 
(.027) 
-.0028 
(.016) 
.1156 
(.005)** 
.1280 
(.007)** 
.0059 
(.007) 
.0100 
(.011)** 
.1512 
(.015)** 
-.0005 
(.016) 
.0566 
(.004)** 
.0644 
(.006)** 
.0053 
(.007) 
.0578 
(.009)** 
.0637 
(.014)** 
.0024 
(.015) 
.0001 
(.012) 
.0014 
(.007) 
.0020 
(.005) 
-.0120 
(.0145) 
-.0005 
(.123) 
.0078 
(.004)* 
.0027 
(.012) 
.0003 
(.012) 
.0039 
(.003) 
-.0129 
(.008) 
.0032 
(.007) 
-.0003 
(.002) 
.0004 
(.007) 
.0015 
(.007) 
* Significant at the 5 percent level; ** significant at the 1 percent level, 
a. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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papers that examine exogenous increases in minimum wages across U.S. 
states. 
This unorthodox finding, which has caused an enormous debate among 
labor economists, has interesting implications for labor market policies in 
developing countries. If policymakers can raise wages by increasing the 
statutory minimum or encouraging compliance with the existing minimum 
without increasing unemployment, then minimum wage policies could 
become a powerful tool for combating poverty. This was precisely the 
thinking behind a 1995 World Bank report, which strongly recommended 
the introduction of a national minimum wage to reduce poverty in Trinidad 
and Tobago. 
One consequence of this debate in the United States has been a number 
of new studies on the impact of minimum wages on employment in devel 
oping countries. Strobl and Walsh examine the impact of a national mini 
mum wage introduced in Trinidad and Tobago in 1998; Bell examines the 
impact of minimum wages in Colombia and Mexico; and Maloney and 
Nunez examine the impact of minimum wages in eight Latin American 
countries.22 Three studies examine the impact of the rising minimum wage 
on employment in Indonesia.23 
The results are mixed. For example, Bell finds that minimum wages in 
Colombia led to employment declines, while the minimum wage in Mexico 
had no impact on employment.24 Strobl and Walsh find inconclusive effects 
for Trinidad and Tobago, in part because the minimum wage appears not to 
have been enforced across both sexes.25 All these studies, using primarily 
labor force data and in some cases plant-level data, uncover widespread evi 
dence of lack of compliance. In Honduras, for example, which has a very 
high minimum wage relative to average wages, the minimum wage appears 
to have had no impact on the wage distribution. 
The most recent study, by Alatas and Cameron, uses the most sophisti 
cated approach in its effort to identify the impact of the rising minimum 
wage on employment in Indonesia.26 Using a difference-in-difference 
approach, the authors seek to examine whether employment in the textile 
and apparel sector fell as a result of the minimum wage. Following Card 
22. Strobl and Walsh (2000), Bell (1997), Maloney and Nunez (2003). 
23. Rama (1996), SMERU (2001), and Alatas and Cameron (2003). 
24. Bell (1997). 
25. Strobl and Walsh (2000). 
26. Alatas and Cameron (2003). 
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and Krueger, they exploit the large geographic variation in the rate of 
increase and compare changes in employment on either side of the Jakarta 
West Java border.27 Comparing similar types of enterprises, they examine 
the employment impact of the minimum wage using the same census data 
as we use in this study, but they focus exclusively on firms in the clothing, 
textiles, leather, and footwear industries. They find no employment impact 
for large firms?foreign or domestic. 
In table 5 we use the difference-in-differences (DID) approach adopted 
by Card and Krueger to examine the impact of minimum wages on employ 
ment in Indonesia.28 We focus on the changes in employment between 1990 
and 1996, which was the period of the large rise in both the magnitude and 
compliance with the minimum wage. The first column of table 5 reports the 
number of production workers in 1990 and 1996, and the difference 
between 1990 and 1996. The third row reports the difference for all plants, 
while the fourth row reports the difference in employment between 1990 
and 1996 only for plants with data on employment in both years. Across all 
enterprises, the mean number of employees increased, from an average of 
131 employees per plant to an average of 149 employees per plant. Column 
2 reports those same differences for plants outside textiles, apparel, and 
footwear (TFA), while column 3 reports those changes for plants only in the 
textiles, apparel, and footwear sector. Column 4 reports the difference-in 
differences, which is the difference in the change in employment across 
TFA and non-TFA firms between 1990 and 1996. As indicated, the differ 
ence-in-differences is positive, suggesting that compared to the change in 
employment across other types of enterprises between 1990 and 1996, the 
change in employment for TFA plants was larger. The results suggest that 
increased vigilance vis-?-vis textiles and apparel enterprises did not appear 
to hurt their employment, at least relative to growth in employment of other 
types of enterprises. 
The sections of table 5 redo this analysis in different ways. The second 
section of table 5 assesses the difference-in-differences in employment 
change for exporters only, followed by a section with analysis for foreign 
enterprises only. Comparing the results across the first three sections of 
table 5, there is no evidence that greater compliance with the minimum 
wage negatively affected employment in foreign enterprises, exporting 
27. See Card and Krueger (1994). 
28. Card and Krueger (1995). 
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Table 5. Changes in Mean Number of Production Workers 
TFA only 
- 
All plants Non-TFA TFA only non-TFA 
All firms 
1990 131 118 182 +64 
1996 14  125 283 +158 
Change 1990-96 +18 +7 101 +94 
Change 1990-96 for firms with 
data in both years +46 +34 +132 +98 
Firms that exported in 1996 
1990 131 118 182 +64 
1996 421 328 718 +390 
Change 1990-96 +290 +210 +536 +326 
Change 1990-96 for firms with 
data in both years +181 +125 +356 +231 
Firms with foreign ownership, 1996 
1990 371 297 782 +485 
1996 506 352 1110 +758 
Change 1990-96 +135 +55 +328 +273 
Change 1990-96 for firms with 
data in both years +194 +113 +458 +345 
Exporters only 
Low minimum wage 
1990 384 326 558 +232 
1996 300 249 724 +475 
Change 1990-96 -84 -77 +166 +243 
High minimum wage 
1990 323 324 322 -  
1996 470 348 694 +346 
Change 1990-96 +147 +24 +372 +348 
Nonexporters only 
Low minimum wage 
1990 91 75 141 +66 
1996 72 63 118 +55 
Change 1990-96 -19 -8 -23 -11 
High minimum wage 
1990 87 88 83 -5 
1996 107 103 121 +18 
Change 1990-96 +20 +15 +38 +18 
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enterprises, or textiles and apparel producers. In fact it is clear from table 5 
that employment growth was significantly higher for exporters and foreign 
enterprises, as well as for textiles and apparel plants. The last two sections 
of table 5 provide a breakdown of high and low minimum wage regions. 
Within TFA enterprises, either for exporters or nonexporters, there is no evi 
dence that higher minimum wages negatively affected employment. These 
results are consistent with Alatas and Cameron.29 These somewhat unortho 
dox results are the subject of further research by the authors. 
Conclusions 
This paper addresses an ongoing concern that globalization is eroding 
labor standards. Despite the increasing attention to this issue, there have 
been no direct tests of whether firms are more or less likely to comply with 
labor standards when they are faced with international competition. We 
derive an explicit test: are multinationals or exporting enterprises more or 
less likely to comply with minimum wage legislation than other types of 
firms? The broad trends during the 1990s suggest that both multinationals 
and exporting firms are more likely to comply with labor standards. These 
trends are reinforced by the statistical tests, which show that foreign and 
exporting enterprises remain more likely to comply with minimum wage 
legislation. 
However, if we add controls for capital intensity and technical change, the 
differences in compliance probabilities between foreign plants and other 
enterprises are cut in half, and the likelihood of compliance for exporters 
switches from positive to negative. At the beginning of the 1990s, exporters 
were significantly less likely to adhere to minimum wage laws compared to 
other similar plants. It appears that the aspect of exporters that is associated 
with greater minimum wage compliance is their greater capital intensity and 
higher investment in technical change. From a policy perspective, there are 
several ways to increase compliance with minimum wage laws. Encouraging 
export activity or multinational enterprises is one approach. Another 
approach would be to encourage policies that lead to capital investments and 
investments in new technology. Even with plant controls, however, there is 
no evidence that multinationals are less likely to adhere to labor standards. 
29. See Alatas and Cameron (2003). 
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We also find that there is a significant upward trend in compliance with 
minimum wage legislation for exporting enterprises during the 1990s. The 
probability of compliance with minimum wage legislation for exporting 
firms increased by about 3 percent a year. We hypothesize that this upward 
trend is connected with pressure from the United States and European gov 
ernments, human rights activists, and news coverage. Turning to an exami 
nation of the garment and apparel industry, which has been the focus of 
human rights groups, we find that these trends are even more striking in this 
sector. The significant upward trend in compliance with minimum wage 
laws for exporters, combined with the even stronger record for the tradi 
tional sweatshop industries, is intriguing. It suggests that human rights 
activism in fact has had an impact on firm behavior. The combination of 
activism, international pressure, and increasing outward orientation by 
Indonesian manufacturing enterprises suggests that, in fact, it is possible to 
combine more globalization with higher labor standards. The results also 
suggest, contrary to expectations, that forcing firms to adhere to higher 
labor standards need not have adverse consequences for employment. 
Overall, the evidence in this paper refutes the claim that pressures to 
compete in the global market place are creating a race to the bottom. The 
evidence for Indonesia in the 1990s suggests that firms touched by the 
global market place were more, not less, likely to comply with labor stan 
dards. In part this increase in compliance is likely to have resulted from 
pressure imposed by the United States, which used the GSP as a mechanism 
to enforce labor standards in Indonesia, combined with increasing human 
rights activism. Quantifying the linkages between U.S. pressure, human 
rights activism, and labor market outcomes is the topic of further research. 
What is truly remarkable is that compliance increased despite a doubling of 
the real value of the minimum wage in Indonesia during this period, enor 
mous increases in foreign investment and export sales, and a painful cur 
rency crisis that erupted in late 1997. 
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Table A-l. Nominal Regional Minimum Wage in Indonesia, 1985-2000 
1 
Rupiah/month_ 
Province 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
Aceh 42,000 42,000 42,000 42,000 63,990 63,990 63,990 
North Sumatra 25,500 25,500 25.500 36,000 36,000 57,900 57,900 76,500 
Riau 33,750 33,690 42,000 55,950 55,950 60,000 60,000 81,000 
Riau Islands 33,750 33,690 42,000 55,950 55,950 60,000 60,000 81,000 
RiauBatam 73,500 73,500 73,500 166,500 166,500 
West Sumatra 30,000 30,000 60,000 48,000 48,000 52,500 
Jambi 28,500 28,500 28,500 33,000 33,000 33,000 49,500 63,000 
South Sumatra 33,000 33,000 48,000 48,000 48,000 
South Sumatra 
Islands 33,000 33,000 48,000 48,000 48,000 
Bengkulu 39,000 39,000 39,000 39,000 60,000 
Lampung 18,000 18,000 31,500 31,500 31,500 52,500 52,500 52,500 
Jakarta 39,000 39,000 48,000 48,000 48,000 63,000 75,000 75,000 
West Java I 20,250 20,250 22,500 22,500 22,500 36,000 54,000 54,000 
West Java II 20,250 20,250 22,500 22,500 22,500 36,000 54,000 54,000 
West Java III 20,250 20,250 22,500 22,500 22,500 36,000 54,000 54,000 
West Java IV 20,250 20,250 22,500 22,500 22,500 36,000 54,000 54,000 
Central Java 19,050 19,050 19,050 23,400 23,400 23,400 48,000 48,000 
Yogyakarta 13,500 13,500 21,000 21,000 21,000 27,000 27,000 37,500 
East Java I 19,050 19,050 24,390 24,390 24,390 42,270 42,270 63,000 
East Java II 19,050 19,050 24,390 24,390 24,390 42,270 42,270 63,000 
East Java III 19,050 19,050 24,390 24,390 24,390 42,270 42,270 63,000 
East Java IV 19,050 19,050 24,390 24,390 24,390 42,270 42,270 63,000 
Bali I 30,000 30,000 36,000 36,000 36,000 54,000 54,000 60,000 
Bali II 30,000 30,000 36,000 36,000 36,000 54,000 54,000 60,000 
West 
Kalimantan 30,000 30,000 30,000 42,000 42,000 42,000 54,000 54,000 
Central 
Kalimantan 25,500 25,500 30,000 30,000 30,000 48,000 48,000 
South 
Kalimantan 19,500 28,500 28,500 28,500 34,500 34,500 39,000 68,250 
East Kalimantan 30,000 30,000 30,000 48,000 48,000 48,000 
South 
Sulawesi 27,000 27,000 27,000 30,000 30,000 30,000 40,500 52,500 
Central 
Sulawesi 21,000 21,000 21,000 25,500 33,000 33,000 
Southeast 
Sulawesi 15,000 22,500 22,500 22,500 22,500 47,970 47,970 63,750 
North Sulawesi 15,750 15,750 25,500 25,500 25,500 25,500 60,000 60,000 
West Nusa 
Tenggara 15,000 15,000 19,500 19,500 19,500 38,250 38,250 45,000 
East Nusa 
Tenggara 30,000 30,000 30,000 48,000 48,000 48,000 
Molucca 30,000 30,000 54,000 54,000 54,000 
West Papua 48,000 48,000 48,000 48,000 54,000 54,000 72,000 72,000 
continued on next page 
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Table A-l. Nominal Regional Minimum Wage in Indonesia, 1985-2000 (continued) 
Rupiah/month_ 
Province 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Aceh 78,000 94,500 105,000 115,500 128,000 147,000 171,000 265,000 
North Sumatra 93,000 112,500 126,000 138,000 151,000 174,000 210,000 254,000 
Riau 81,000 93,000 124,500 138,000 151,500 174,000 218,000 250,700 
Riau Islands 81,000 93,000 124,500 138,000 151,500 174,000 218,000 300,000 
RiauBatam 166,500 202,500 202,500 220,500 235,000 270,000 290,000 350,000 
West Sumatra 57,000 75,000 97,500 108,000 119,000 137,000 160,000 200,000 
Jambi 72,000 90,000 99,000 108,000 119,500 137,500 150,000 173,000 
South Sumatra 69,000 90,000 105,000 115,500 127,500 146,500 170,000 196,000 
South Sumatra 
Islands 69,000 90,000 105,000 115,500 135,000 155,500 181,000 209,000 
Bengkulu 60,000 90,000 105,000 115,500 127,500 146,500 150,000 173,000 
Lampung 73,500 90,000 105,000 114,000 126,000 145,000 160,000 192,000 
Jakarta 90,000 114,000 138,000 156,000 172,500 198,500 231,000 286,000 
West Java I 66,000 114,000 138,000 156,000 172,500 198,500 230,000 286,000 
West Java II 66,000 114,000 138,000 142,500 157,500 181,000 210,000 245,000 
West Java III 66,000 114,000 138,000 132,000 145,500 167,500 200,000 230,000 
West Java IV 66,000 114,000 138,000 129,000 139,000 160,000 195,000 225,000 
Central Java 60,000 81,000 90,000 102,000 113,000 130,000 153,000 185,000 
Yogyakarta 48,000 66,000 85,500 96,000 106,500 122,500 130,000 194,500 
East Java I 63,000 90,000 111,000 120,000 132,500 152,500 182,000 236,000 
East Java II 63,000 90,000 111,000 117,000 127,500 146,500 174,000 212,000 
East Java III 63,000 90,000 111,000 111,000 121,000 139,000 166,000 208,000 
East Java IV 63,000 90,000 111,000 108,000 116,500 134,000 160,000 202,000 
Balil 75,000 99,000 117,000 127,500 141,500 162,500 187,000 214,300 
Bali II 75,000 99,000 117,000 127,500 141,500 162,500 166,000 190,300 
West 
Kalimantan 67,500 90,000 105,000 114,000 126,500 145,500 175,000 228,000 
Central 
Kalimantan 70,500 82,500 111,000 124,500 138,000 158,500 195,000 285,000 
South 
Kalimantan 68,250 90,000 105,000 114,000 125,000 144,000 166,000 200,000 
East 
Kalimantan 72,000 97,500 126,000 138,000 153,000 176,000 194,000 233,000 
South Sulawesi 52,500 69,000 93,000 102,000 112,500 129,500 148,000 200,000 
Central 
Sulawesi 52,500 69,000 84,000 96,000 106,500 122,500 150,000 203,000 
Southeast 
Sulawesi 63,750 84,000 100,500 109,500 121,000 139,000 160,000 210,000 
North Sulawesi 60,000 81,000 97,500 108,000 118,000 135,500 155,000 186,000 
West Nusa 
Tenggara 54,000 70,500 88,500 97,500 108,000 124,000 145,000 180,000 
East Nusa 
Tenggara 63,000 75,000 87,000 96,000 106,500 122,500 143,000 184,000 
Molucca 69,000 93,000 114,000 123,000 136,000 156,500 180,000 
West Papua 105,000 135,000 142,500 154,500 170,000 195,500 225,000 315,000 
Comments and 
Discussion 
Susan Collins: In this paper Ann Harrison and Jason Scorse revisit from a 
new perspective the controversial question of whether globalization erodes 
labor standards. Using panel data, the authors examine determinants of 
whether firms comply with minimum wage regulations in Indonesia. The 
empirical analysis makes use of the annual manufacturing survey for 
1990-99, which provides considerable detail about firm characteristics and 
behavior. 
The authors find that foreign-owned firms are more likely to comply than 
domestic firms. Interestingly, the compliance probability for domestic 
exporters appears to have increased over time, which, the authors hypothe 
size, reflects the impact of international pressures to improve labor stan 
dards. By the end of the sample period, Indonesian firms that export have 
become more likely to comply than nonexporting domestic firms. These 
results are statistically significant and quite robust. Thus the authors con 
clude that there is no evidence of a race to the bottom or that globalization is 
eroding labor standards. 
This paper has many strengths. In particular the empirical analysis is 
done carefully and generates results that are plausible, though provocative. 
The authors have explored many suggestions and issues raised regarding an 
earlier draft of their paper, enabling them to dispel some initial criticisms. 
The richness of the data used and details of the Indonesian experience make 
this an unusual and interesting episode to examine. In particular there is 
considerable variation in Indonesia's minimum wages, both over time and 
across regions in any given year. 
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As already stated, I find the basic results in the paper both plausible and 
interesting. However, I would argue that the authors sometimes push their 
preferred interpretation (that this is evidence against globalization eroding 
labor standards) too far. My comment discusses this point from a variety of 
perspectives. I suggest some dimensions of minimum wage compliance 
that, in my view, warrant further analysis and would enrich our understand 
ing of the Indonesian experience. 
There is considerable evidence in the existing literature, based on studies 
for a range of different countries, that both foreign-owned firms and domes 
tic exporters tend to pay higher wages.1 From this perspective, the finding 
here (that such firms are less likely to pay below the minimum wage) is not 
at all surprising. Indeed, after controlling for a fuller set of plant-level char 
acteristics, the authors note that their results "provide an explanation why 
multinationals and exporters are more likely to pay the minimum wage: 
they are more capital intensive, highly productive enterprises whose work 
ers are more highly paid." Furthermore, when the authors control for capital 
intensity and other plant characteristics, they find exporters are less likely to 
comply than nonexporting domestic firms. Given these results, it is surpris 
ing to see the authors' suggestion in their paper's conclusion that encourag 
ing export orientation or foreign ownership may be a way for policymakers 
in Indonesia to raise compliance with minimum wage laws. 
The authors focus on export orientation and foreign ownership as indica 
tors of the extent to which firms are subject to global pressures. Appropri 
ately, they have explored alternative versions of these measures. Their ear 
lier work defined continuous variables and linked annual changes in these 
measures to compliance. This raised concerns such as reverse causation. In 
the current version, EXP and FOR simply distinguish firms with high global 
exposure from those with low global exposure. The fact that the results are 
robust to these specification changes is reassuring. 
However, the estimation results presented in the paper do not address the 
bigger underlying concern that EXP and FOR are endogenous. This concern 
is exacerbated by defining EXP and FOR as firm-specific indicators, which 
may act as proxies for other firm-level characteristics that are not included 
among the regression's explanatory variables. If these omitted firm charac 
teristics are positively correlated with the wage the firm would choose to 
pay, then the coefficients on EXP and FOR will overstate the true effects of 
1. See Brown, Deardorff, and Stern (2003) for a recent survey. 
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globalization on compliance. The analysis at the paper's end, which controls 
for plant-level productivity, does begin to address this concern. Interest 
ingly, FOR remains positively and significantly related to compliance. And 
the authors do state that they have addressed the potential endogeneity prob 
lem using instrumental variables in other work. Additional detail here would 
be useful, as this is important to convince one of the interpretation the 
authors give to these coefficients. 
The authors suggest that pressures from human rights activists, both 
internal and external to Indonesia, help to explain the estimated trend 
increase in compliance by domestic exporters. (However, if such pressure 
was effective in increasing compliance of domestic exporters, I would have 
expected it to have an even greater effect on foreign-owned firms. In this 
context, I find puzzling the fact that the authors find no econometric evi 
dence of increasing compliance among foreign-owned firms over time.) The 
paper clearly documents that these pressures did rise during the decade, and 
that compliance did increase, particularly for exporters, from the middle to 
the end of the decade. But while I am willing to believe that these pressures 
played some role, it seems to me that a strong case for this linkage requires 
a more careful look at the timing of developments than the authors provide. 
In fact the compliance data provided in the paper suggest a stronger role for 
an alternative factor that received little attention in the authors' analysis: the 
evolution of the real value of minimum wages. To make these points, it is 
useful to summarize the trend behavior of average minimum wages. I focus 
here on production workers only. 
The paper's figure 7 shows average compliance each year for domestic 
firms, distinguishing between exporters and nonexporters. Broadly speak 
ing, the two groups exhibit a similar pattern, with compliance always higher 
for exporters than nonexporters. During 1990-93, compliance is relatively 
high (over 70 percent of exporting firms and roughly 55-65 percent of non 
exporting firms). Compliance drops sharply in 1994, and slightly more in 
1995, to about 55 percent for exporters and 35-40 percent for nonexporters. 
It begins to rise for both groups during 1996-97, followed by greater 
increases in the final years of the decade. By 1999 over 70 percent of 
exporters again comply with minimum wage laws, comparable to the 
1991-93 period, but still below the 1990 level. Just over 50 percent of non 
exporters complied in 1999, still somewhat below the levels from 1990-93. 
Can the timing of increased labor rights activism help to explain these 
trends? In terms of internal pressures, the paper notes that several labor 
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unions were formed in Indonesia in the early 1990s. Externally, we are told, 
U.S. groups filed a complaint under GSP in 1992 (and previously, in 1987). 
The paper also provides information about articles in major newspapers. 
The paper's figure 3 shows that articles about sweatshops surged in 
1995-96, while figure 4 shows that Indonesia-specific articles about labor 
issues (sweatshops and child labor) soared in 1996. Thus the 1995-96 
increase in compliance may have been responding to pressures from the 
newspaper coverage. But recall that this increase was quite modest. Perhaps 
this altered external environment set the stage for the greater 1998-99 rise 
in compliance. But the compliance decline in 1994 (after the introduction of 
new local unions) is not easily reconciled with developments in human 
rights pressures identified in the paper. Clearly, there are additional factors 
at work. 
Firm compliance would be expected to vary inversely with the real mini 
mum wage, which suggests one possible factor. A casual look at trends in 
the annual average minimum wage deflated by the CPI suggests this may 
indeed have played a central role in firm compliance.2 This series rises 
slowly during 1990-93, as increases in the nominal minimum exceed price 
inflation. The real value of the minimum wage then jumped by nearly 25 
percent in 1994, remaining high through 1997. However, a surge in inflation 
in 1998 then pushed the real value of the average minimum wage back to its 
1993 level. These developments closely match both the 1994 decline and 
1998-99 rise in firm compliance described above. It would be interesting to 
undertake a more formal analysis that attempted to link compliance with 
labor rights pressures (perhaps using data on newspaper coverage), and con 
trolling for additional factors such as the evolution of the real minimum 
wage. 
The discussion above focuses on the behavior of the average minimum 
wage over time. The average masks surprisingly large differences across 
regions. As pointed out by Vivi Alatas and Lisa Cameron, "this gives rise to 
arbitrary differences in the legal minimum between firms that are geograph 
ically close but on different sides of provincial borders. A particularly strik 
ing difference in minimums occurs within the bounds of Greater Jakarta 
(which is the manufacturing hub of Indonesia), part of which is in the 
2. The annual average minimum wage data were supplied by the paper's authors. This 
series was deflated by the CPI (obtained from International Monetary Fund, International 
Financial Statistics) to construct the real minimum wage for Indonesia. The resulting annual 
index from 1990 to 1999 (1995 = 100), is 60, 66, 69, 74, 92, 100, 100, 104, 75, 72. 
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Table 6. Minimum Wages by Province, 1988-99 
Rupiah/month_ 
Province 1988 1992 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Jakarta 48,000 75,000 13,8000 156,000 172,500 198,500 231,000 
West Java I 22,500 54,000 13,8000 156,000 172,500 198,500 230,000 
West Java II 22,500 54,000 13,8000 142,500 157,500 181,000 210,000 
West Java III 22,500 54,000 13,8000 132,000 145,500 167,500 200,000 
West Java IV 22,500 54,000 13,8000 129,000 139,000 160,000 195,000 
Source: Data provided by Harrison and Scorse. 
province of Jakarta and part in the neighboring province of West Java."3 
Table 6 shows the minimum wage for Jakarta and the four West Java 
provinces in selected years from 1988 to 1999. In 1988 the Jakarta mini 
mum was more than twice that in West Java, but by 1995 these had been 
equalized. However, considerable variation reemerged in 1996, with the 
minimum actually declining in two of the more rural parts of Java and rising 
in the parts closer to Jakarta. By the end of the decade, there was an 18 per 
cent gap between the highest and lowest of these minimums. These figures 
suggest that the political economy of how these provincial minimums are 
set would be complex and interesting. A closer look at these issues would 
provide a more nuanced story about firm compliance. This discussion also 
suggests that provincial minimum wages should be treated as endogenous 
variables in the econometrics. 
The cross-section variation in minimum wages is clearly exploited by the 
panel nature of the paper's empirical analysis. But it would have been inter 
esting to push this analysis further and explore hypotheses about the con 
centration of noncompliant firms. For example, what accounts for the 
increase in noncompliance during the mid-1990s? Is it primarily explained 
by firms that are temporarily out of compliance, such as those in provinces 
with sharp minimum wage increases that take a year or two to raise their 
own wages accordingly? Or is it mainly because a subset of firms persist 
ently pay wages below the legal minimum? 
In sum, Harrison and Scorse have provided a useful look at the determi 
nants of compliance with minimum wage laws in Indonesia during the 
1990s. Not surprisingly, multinationals are consistently more, not less, 
likely to comply. And their likelihood of compliance does not seem to have 
3. Alatas and Cameron (2003, pp. 2-3). 
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increased despite dramatically increased attention to labor rights in Indone 
sia by international activists. Controlling for plant characteristics, domestic 
exporters were initially less likely to comply. But their compliance did seem 
to rise over time, perhaps responding to such pressure. This is interesting 
and provocative. To really pin down the role of such international pressures 
will require further work that reflects, among other things, the complex 
interaction between the political economy of minimum wage setting and 
additional details about the timing of various developments. This most 
likely will entail some case study analysis across provinces to complement 
the econometric work. I look forward to seeing additional pieces in the story 
uncovered. 
Kimberly Ann Elliott: Ann Harrison and Jason Scorse have written a very 
interesting and provocative paper exploring the linkages among globaliza 
tion, labor standards, and the potential impact of the antisweatshop move 
ment on Indonesian workers. Contrary to concerns expressed by antisweat 
shop activists, Harrison and Scorse find little evidence of a race to the 
bottom arising from globalization?and none at all in the targeted textile, 
apparel, and footwear sectors. But contrary to the concerns expressed by 
supporters of globalization, neither did the authors find that increased 
wages, perhaps spurred by activist pressures, negatively affected employ 
ment. As someone who likes to use the metaphor of Siamese twins to 
describe the relationship between globalization and labor standards, I find 
this is a gratifying result. 
Using plant-level data from Indonesia's annual manufacturing survey, 
the authors analyze whether foreign-owned and exporting plants were more 
or less likely than domestic plants to comply with Indonesia's legal mini 
mum wage during the 1990s, a time when the minimum wage doubled in 
real terms. The general results are similar to those in numerous other papers 
(including some by Harrison), which find that foreign-owned firms in 
developing countries pay more, on average, than local firms supplying the 
local market. Like many other studies, this paper also finds that most of the 
difference can be explained by higher capital intensity, the need for rela 
tively higher skills, and other plant- and sector-specific characteristics. Thus 
they conclude that multinational corporations are not encouraging a race to 
the bottom by squeezing wages in poor countries. 
The story gets more interesting and less conventional when Harrison and 
Scorse look at exporting firms. After controlling for worker and plant 
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specific characteristics, the authors find that in the early and mid-1990s, 
firms with substantial exports were less likely to comply with the minimum 
wage law than similar plants that did not export. But Harrison and Scorse 
also show that exporter compliance increased over the decade, even as the 
real minimum wage was rising, and that compliance was actually better and 
increased even faster in the textile, apparel, and footwear sectors.1 They 
hypothesize that the increasing compliance in the latter half of the 1990s 
might be explained by pressures from the U.S. government and transna 
tional activists. 
To explore whether higher minimum wages and improved compliance 
contributed to increased unemployment, Harrison and Scorse do a differ 
ence-in-differences analysis of changes in employment across different 
Indonesian sectors. Contrary to the fears of many globalization enthusiasts 
about the negative effects of external pressure and activist demands for 
higher wages, the authors find that relative to other sectors, employment 
growth was higher in foreign-owned and exporting plants, especially in the 
textile, apparel, and footwear sectors. 
These are intriguing results. But there are other extensions of the 
research that could go further in answering the questions raised in the paper. 
First and most obvious, the authors have demonstrated only a correlation 
between increasing compliance with minimum wages and increasing exter 
nal pressure (as measured by news stories on sweatshops and child labor). It 
would be useful to directly test the hypothesis of a causal relationship by 
gathering information on foreign owners or exporters that sell to buyers that 
are members of one of the multistakeholder code of conduct initiatives, 
which require independent monitoring of compliance. This analysis might 
be possible, at least for a subsample of these firms, because some factory 
specific information (including addresses) is available on the company's 
own website or that of one of the multistakeholder initiatives, such as Social 
Accountability International and Fair Labor Association. For example, as a 
result of pressure from the group United Students Against Sweatshops, 
many colleges and universities now require licensees that produce school 
logo apparel and other items to disclose contact information for all of their 
suppliers. 
Second, in an earlier version of the paper, the authors provided a break 
down by gender for some of the worker characteristics (educational attain 
1. They find no change in the probability of compliance by foreign-owned firms. 
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ment). It would be interesting to test whether this information could be 
used to explore whether there are any differences in gender discrimination 
among the various types of firms. Are foreign-owned firms or exporters any 
more likely than local firms to hire or promote women to nonproduction 
jobs? Does the gender composition of employment, after controlling for 
sector-specific differences, affect the likelihood of compliance with mini 
mum wages by various types of firms? 
This last extension could also address criticisms that the paper claims too 
much. The motivation of the paper is to explore the assertion that globaliza 
tion is contributing to a race to the bottom in compliance with labor stan 
dards. But the paper addresses only one such standard?minimum wages? 
and that standard is not among the core labor standards accepted by 
international consensus as appropriate for universal application. 
The core standards, as defined by the International Labor Organization 
(ILO) are: freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining; 
elimination of forced labor; abolition of child labor; and nondiscrimination 
in employment. It is not clear that Harrison and Scorse's results on mini 
mum wages tell us anything about compliance with these other standards. 
Such evidence as exists from the ILO, multistakeholder monitoring, and 
other sources suggests that firms that are in compliance with minimum 
wage laws probably do not use child labor or forced labor.2 But there is no 
reason to think that such firms necessarily comply with nondiscrimination 
norms or respect freedom of association, and there is at least anecdotal evi 
dence to the contrary. 
Finally, the authors mention but do not discuss the results of an exten 
sion of the research that looks at the implications of labor standards for 
firms' exit decisions. If there is a tendency for foreign firms to exit as 
labor standards rise, this would seem to be evidence of race to the bottom 
from pressures of globalization?and it may not be a race to the bottom 
from the top or a race to the bottom across the board. Rather it may be a 
race to the bottom from the bottom, among similarly situated developing 
countries and, in particular, in low-wage, highly price-competitive, and 
internationally mobile sectors like apparel and footwear. This conclusion 
might be undermined by the results on rising employment, including in 
2. For an overview of the global status of compliance with each of the four core stan 
dards, see International Labor Office (2000, 2001, 2002, 2003). For a brief summary and 
other references, see Elliott and Freeman (2003, chap. 1). 
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the textile, apparel, and footwear sectors. But this could be a short-term 
effect, and so results on firm exit would also be enlightening on these 
issues. 
In the case of Indonesia at the end of the sample period, one also has a 
new (admittedly weak) democracy, which is trying to raise labor standards 
and, importantly, relax restrictions on freedom of association and collective 
bargaining rights. In this context, Harrison and Scorse's comment that Nike 
is planning to move many of its factories from Indonesia to lower-wage 
Vietnam, purportedly because of the latter country's greater political stabil 
ity, is disturbing. Shunning an emerging democracy in favor of an authori 
tarian regime that bans independent unions may make perfect business 
sense, but it also has the whiff of a race to the bottom. 
Discussion: The discussion focused mostly on the interpretation of the 
empirical results reported in the paper. Tom Palley reiterated Susan 
Collins's point that it would be better if the paper's focus was stated as min 
imum wage compliance rather than globalization or the race to the bottom. 
Palley also raised what he thought were anomalies in some of the regres 
sions. The log of the minimum wage enters with a positive and significant 
coefficient in some cases, while the compliance model says there should be 
lower compliance when the minimum wage goes up. The coefficient on 
multinational presence goes away when labor force characteristics are con 
trolled for, which seems to weaken some of the conclusions at the end. 
Ransford Palmer expressed surprise that there was no labor union variable 
in the model. Where unions are strong, wage rates and compliance are likely 
to be higher. 
Robert Blecker wondered how well the paper is able to address the race 
to the bottom issue with the kind of data and methods that are being used 
here. There are some fairly obvious reasons why one would expect export 
ing firms and firms with foreign investment to pay higher wages. The race 
to the bottom argument relates to the idea that if you comply with minimum 
wage legislation, the investment may move to Vietnam, China, or some 
other place. The paper does not look directly at this. While there may be 
problems in getting data on this, one might want to look at global market 
shares and the extent to which firms in Indonesia are competing with firms 
in other locations, where standards are lower. Blecker also wondered if the 
results might be capturing an exchange rate effect, as the rupiah is sharply 
devalued in the sample period. This may have increased the compliance of 
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exporting firms over time, since Indonesian exports have become much 
more competitive as a result of the devaluation. 
Penny Goldberg commented that the paper missed out on one angle of 
the race to the bottom argument, namely the claim that firms that are 
exposed to import competition may outsource activities to small firms or 
hire temporary workers who are paid much less than the minimum wage. 
Suppose big multinational or export firms continue to pay high wages, but 
outsource the low-skill activities to small firms as a response to increased 
import competition. The analysis in this paper would miss this completely, 
and the firms that engage in this practice would appear to have higher 
wages. One way to pick up this potential effect is to look at what happens to 
the really small firms in the sample, as presumably these are the ones that 
pay lower wages. Goldberg also questioned whether the average wage 
might be picking up increased dispersion. For example, if managers' 
salaries rise significantly while some people get paid way below the mini 
mum wage, the average may go up while those at the bottom of the wage 
distribution are worse off. Looking at compliance levels for those with the 
lowest educational qualifications may help pick this up. 
Thea Lee said that as a practitioner of anticorporate global activism she 
found the paper puzzling. She did not think the argument was that foreign 
companies or exporters are more likely to violate labor standards than 
domestic or nonexporting companies. She felt that the issue is a different 
one, namely that in a dynamic and competitive global economy without any 
minimum standards for labor rights, the competition between governments 
and, to some extent, between companies will sometimes take the form of 
labor sweating?and that is bad for workers in both poor and rich countries. 
By contrast, we have minimum standards for a lot of corporate issues, such 
as intellectual property rights, investment regulation, or financial services. 
Moreover, focusing on compliance with the minimum wage is really an odd 
choice for the international labor standards debate, because there is really 
very little emphasis on enforcing minimum wages or raising minimum 
wages through trade agreements in the WTO. It is really all about freedom 
of association. One sees countries repress labor unions in order to keep 
wages down and attract direct foreign investment. The competition between 
Honduras and El Salvador, or between China and Mexico, is dragged down 
by one bad player. China's total repression of independent labor unions, as 
well as the country's huge size and low wages, cannot be ignored by other 
developing countries, since they inevitably compete with China. If workers 
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had the right to form a union in any country, then multinational corporations 
would not be able to look for places where workers have the fewest labor 
rights. 
Aart Kraay expressed concern that the result about foreign firms being 
more likely to comply may be driven by unobserved characteristics of for 
eign firms that make them pay higher wages. While there are controls for 
observable determinants of productivity in the regressions, at some level 
productivity is fundamentally unobservable. Related to that, there is the 
well-known result that foreign firms tend to cherry pick domestic firms with 
better skills. Or another mundane reason is that foreign firms may be more 
likely to hire expatriate workers who drive up the average wage of the firm. 
In this connection, it is surprising that the initial coefficient for exporters in 
the first year is negative, since there is quite a bit of evidence that exporting 
firms tend to be more productive. Kraay also wondered about alternative 
explanations for the finding. It could be that exporting firms enjoyed more 
rapid productivity growth during the 1990s than nonexporting firms. Or it 
could be that the minimum wage simply rose less slowly than the desired 
distribution of wages that firms are willing to pay. The latter could also 
explain the puzzling positive coefficient on the minimum wage. 
Dani Rodrik suggested that the problems with the constructed compli 
ance rate could be overcome by looking at changes in employment. If there 
are two different types of firms, one of which feels the minimum wage more 
binding than others, one ought to be able to see it in the employment 
responses to changes in the actual minimum wage. The timing of changes in 
the minimum wage may allow a simple difference-in-differences analysis to 
check whether exporter or MNE firms have differentially more negative 
employment responses to rises in the minimum wage. Sylvia Ostry summa 
rized findings from her research on recent developments in the anticorpo 
rate globalization movement and pointed out that concern on the race to the 
bottom in clothing and textiles seemed to be largely an American, not Euro 
pean, phenomenon. 
In her response, Ann Harrison replied briefly to some of the concerns 
that had been raised. She disagreed with Thea Lee and argued that the wage 
behavior of exporters and MNCs remained a point of contention. She also 
thought that focussing on compliance with the minimum wage was appro 
priate, since otherwise labor standards remain a nebulous concept. With 
respect to the questions about the minimum wage switching signs in various 
tables, she pointed out that the reason is that the sample goes from ten years 
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of data to three years of data. The difference in the signs between columns is 
not statistically significant. 
Ann Harrison agreed that looking at outsourcing was important. She also 
agreed that the higher compliance of foreign firms in fact is due to charac 
teristics not picked up in the first set of regressions. When controls for firm 
characteristics are introduced, foreign firms are no more likely to comply 
than other firms with the same characteristics. 
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